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1. Introduction 
Since the early 1990s, the use of competitive tendering has increased in the European public 
transport sector (Gwilliam & van de Velde, 1990; D. M. Van de Velde, 2001). At the same time, the 
number of quasi-autonomous agencies for purchasing public transport services separated from the 
core local government administration has risen especially in Scandinavian countries.1 This 
development has been controversial not only for ideological reasons, but also due to intrinsic 
characteristics of public transport and of public services in general. Whilst the advantages of 
competitive tendering such as cost efficiency and improved quality have been documented in several 
studies (Johnsen, Sletnes, & Vabo, 2004; Sørensen, Borge, & Hagen, 1999), concerns have been 
raised relating to downfalls such as reduced political steering (Longva & Osland, 2010), issues of 
service level compliance (Hensher & Wallis, 2005), lack of coordination (O'Sullivan & Patel, 2004), 
deficient democratic accountability (Flinders, 2004) and legitimacy issues (Prosser, 2010). Given such 
problems and the disputability of the issue, why do local politicians adhere to market-conforming 
principles when European legislation opens up for the possibility to reintegrate the provision of 
services? What explains the choice of institutional design at local level?2  
 The questions’ background is the well-documented tendency that since the enforcement of 
the Single European Act EU decision-making contributes to increased deregulation and reregulation. 
However, deregulation of services has been much more difficult to enforce than of goods (Nicolaïdis 
& Schmidt, 2007; Schmidt, 2009) and reregulation meets resistance due to the increased 
administrative burden for public authorities as well as private enterprises. In order to achieve a 
compromise in certain sectors, it has been necessary to introduce differentiation within EU 
legislation allowing for legal discretion, opt-out clauses and temporary derogations for named 
countries (Howarth & Sadeh, 2010).  
This was the case for the Public Passenger Transport Services Regulation that was decided on 
the 23rd of October 2007 and set to be enforced by the 3rd of December 2009. It introduced 
competition as a main rule for operators to gain the right to provide public transport services on rail 
and roads. Yet the Commission had to give in to a great deal of “watering-down” of competitive 
elements to get its proposal through in the European Parliament and the Council. Opening up for 
substantial excemptions from the main rule, the Regulation contains a great deal of legal discretion.  
                                                          
1
 Didier van De Velde (1999) calls this the “Scandinavian” or “London model.” 
2
 In this paper “local” includes the regional level. 
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At local level the controversial EU legislation spurred debates of reintegration and increased 
coordination. This is especially clear in the major Dutch cities: Amsterdam, The Hague and 
Rotterdam, where strikes against the planned competitive tendering regime, at the time of writing, 
are still going on. Debates of reregulation have also been vibrant in several Norwegian counties.3 
Despite the general trend of “agencification” (Christensen & Lægreid, 2006) and competitive 
tendering of local public transport services, there have been discussions of reintegrating production 
of such services in a number of counties, but none have chosen to do so. The most serious attempt of 
reintegration took place in Sør-Trøndelag. As a case study, Sør-Trøndelag is interesting due to the 
fact that there was a red-green coalition in power, favouring production of public services in public 
hands, both at the regional and the local level. Furthermore, unlike several other counties Sør-
Trøndelag had at the time not established any public transport agency. As reversals of such 
establishments tend to be more costly than new beginnings, the likelihood of reintegration was 
larger than in other counties. Still however, the legislators decided to introduce competitive 
tendering and establish an independent agency to administer the services, instead of producing the 
services themselves. Therefore, Sør-Trøndelag provides an illustrative case of when even leftist 
politicians vote in favour of market-conforming principles.   
I will explain why the initative of reintegration failed in Sør-Trøndelag. I argue that within the 
constraints of the EU Regulation a combination of path dependency and diffusion has led the 
politicians to go against their ideologies and introduce competitive tendering and delegating public 
transport competence to an independent agency. The reason is that earlier decisions to privatise 
publicly owned local bus companies, endow private companies strong powers, given the strict 
concession rules. Hence, existing practices made it less costly and technically easier to go for a 
solution, in which operators have to compete for market access. At the same time, most Norwegian 
counties adopting competitive tendering had already established quasi-autonomous procurement 
bodies. This tendency, learning from other counties and the need to increase competence have 
made such a model seem like the most appropriate thing to do, a choice that was also supported by 
consultancy advice.     
The findings highlight four interesting points. Firstly, they illustrate why a turn away from 
market-driven principles are difficult even in a situation where supranational legislation allows for 
reintegration. Secondly, they contribute to understanding how and to what extent European 
legislation affects member states not only in terms of transposition, but actual application of EU 
legislation (Kaeding, 2007; Sverdrup, 2007). Thirdly, although the literature on how EU policies are 
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 The counties Buskerud, Hedmark, Rogaland, Telemark, Sør-Trøndelag and Vestfold have all carried out 
evaluations or investigations of their organisational models. 
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put into practice domestically has thrived over the last two decades (Treib, 2008, p. 5), the attention 
to such implementation at subnational level has been limited (Goldsmith, 1993; John, 2000). Finally, 
the findings illustrate how local issues drive local politics more than European legislation, which 
nevertheless crucially affects the options available to local authorities.  
To understand why institutional design at local level adheres to competitive tendering and 
agency solutions, I will firstly present useful theoretical perspectives, including hypotheses that guide 
this explorative analysis. Secondly, I will explain what happened in the selected case, Sør-Trøndelag. 
A final session will provide concluding thoughts as to why it is dificult to break away from market-
conforming principles. 
 
2. Theoretical Approaches 
Aiming at explaining the paradox as to why left-oriented politicians vote in favour of market-
conforming principles, theories that account for political outcomes that are not only a response to 
the legislators’ will are useful. Historical institutionalism and diffusion theories provide such 
perspectives. 
Emphasising the structuralism implicit in institutions (Sanders, 2006), historical 
institutionalists focus on how institutions develop over time and affect the position of actors in ways 
that may have been unintended or undesired by their creators (Hall & Taylor, 1996). As institutions 
reinforce themselves, create path dependencies and lock-ins over time, it may be difficult to alter 
certain institutions as reversals are costly or difficult (Pierson, 2004). For example, if public 
authorities have already delegated responsibilities to market actors or separate agencies, path 
dependency is a likely explanation why legislators do not retract the responsibility, even if their aim is 
to do so. Also for cases where this is not the case, there may be certain structures that benefit a path 
towards agencification and competitive tendering rather than internal production and planning. 
Therefore, a path dependent hypothesis expects certain structures to benefit market-conforming 
principles.   
Diffusion theories also offer explanations as to why adoption of policies do not always follow 
political aims. Diffusion refers to the process, by which a policy spreads and this policy is new to the 
jurisdictions adopting it, no matter how old the policy actually is (Walker, 1969, p. 881). It is the 
communication of an innovation in a social system over time (Gray, 1973, p. 1175). The approach 
suggests that adoption of a policy is interdependent – the behaviour of one government influences 
the behaviour of another. Yet researchers disagree about when a pattern of diffusion is actually 
driven by diffusion. Whilst several researchers include coercion as a diffusion mechanism, others 
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(Elkins & Simmons, 2005, p. 39) argue that diffusion happens without coercion and cooperation 
among the adopters. Another matter of dispute concerns functional pressures and whether adoption 
of similar policies is a result of independent reactions to such pressures and, hence, not influenced by 
the behaviour of others (Braun & Gilardi, 2006, p. 305). Such differences of opinion highlight the 
importance of studying the mechanisms behind diffusion patterns.  
Beth Simmons, Frank Dobbin and Geoffrey Garrett (2008) distinguish between four 
mechanisms of diffusion: coercion, competition, learning and emulation. Coercion refers to the 
ability of powerful actors to use carrots and sticks to encourage others to change their policy. 
Although opening for different organisational solutions within public transport, the European 
Commission may, for instance, make competition procedures easier or less risky to carry out than 
production through an internal operator. Furthermore, in literature on Europeanisation a common 
proposition is the misfit hypothesis that postulates that member states’ adoption of EU policies and 
structures is a function of incompatibility between the European Union and the national level, since 
this misfit translates into pressure of the EU on member states (Börzel & Risse, 2003). An underlying 
mechanism is “institutional compliance,“ whereby European legislation prescribes certain 
requirements, with which affected states have to comply (Knill & Lehmkuhl, 2002). Deeming existing 
practices of negotiations illegal, when granting exclusive rights or compensating public service 
operators for costs incurred, pressure to comply is likely to have been present in the Norwegian local 
public transport sector. Hence, a coercive hypothesis predicts that market-conforming decisions are 
caused by institutional compliance. 
On the other hand, as the Public Passenger Transport Services Regulation allows for 
discretion, such compliance pressure does not account for why politicians adhere to market-
conforming principles and not internal operators, which is the traditional way of producing public 
transport services in most European cities (Gwilliam & van de Velde, 1990).4 The Regulation leaves it 
up to the local public transport authorities to choose between a model similar to that of the 
traditional state (i.e. internal operator) and a model of the regulatory state (i.e. competition).5 The 
following continuum between the traditional and the regulatory state provides a useful illustration of 
the alternatives that acquiescent European public transport authorities currently face.  
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 The Regulation defines “internal operators” as legally distinct entities over which a competent local authority 
exercises control similar to that exercised over its own departments. 
5
 There are substantial excemptions from the main rule of competition. The competent authorities can award 
contracts directly for the railway sector, contracts below a certain threshold (e.g. 1 million Euros annually or, if 
the enterprise is small or medium-sized, 2 million Euros) and to an internal operator. 
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Figure 1. Continuum of organisation of public transport services 
 
Different to coercion, competition implies the belief in certain solutions as boosting quality and 
efficiency, thereby making a jurisdiction more popular than others. Thus, a government adopts a 
policy as it perceives that the effect will give its own jurisdiction an advantage. Accordingly, 
politicians choose to pass responsbility on to specialised agencies and introduce competitive 
tendering due to the capacity of competition to achieve cost efficiency and improved quality 
(Domberger & Rimmer, 1994) and the aptitude of agencies to combine professionalism, operational 
autonomy and flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances (Yeung, 2010, p. 76f). Given the need for 
expertise and knowledge due to internationalisation and increased complexity, agencies have 
become popular. Another reason is the credible commitment ensured through delegation, thereby 
keeping politicians on a certain distance (Majone, 1996). The hypothesis conveying this mechanism 
suggests that market-conforming decisions are a matter of improving the services. Whether this 
really is a matter of diffusion is disputed. R. Daniel Kelemen and Eric C. Sibbitt (2004) view such 
functional responses as independent of other jurisdictions’ actions – i.e. that every county would 
itself find similar solutions as they all face the same challenges. Given the tendency of increased 
competitive tendering and agencification, such a position would be difficult to defend (Braun & 
Gilardi, 2006), but if evidence suggests that actions are basically rational acts, not being induced 
through competition with others, diffusion is not likely to have been a dominant cause.  
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At times, diffusion occurs via real life learning. This happens when a government draws 
lessons from the experience of others and then apply these lessons when designing their own 
policies. As an example, hybrid solutions may cater for different local contexts and may ease 
resistance against market principles by representing watered-down solutions. In Figure 1 hybrids are 
located between the traditional and the regulatory structures. They include among others agencies 
that are public enterprises or limited companies with political rather than professional management. 
That way there is a direct link between the legislators and the agency. Other characteristics are the 
extent of delegation as set down in contracts between the core administration and the agency. In 
other words, there are plenty solutions of how to organise local public transport services, implying 
different degrees of separation of policy-making, operating and regulatory functions. Therefore, in-
between solutions may ease resistance against controversial liberalisation and agencification. A 
learning hypothesis suggests that the legislators apply lessons from other counties adjusted to their 
own local conditions.  
Finally, viewing policy-making in the light of diffusion theory also includes non-rational 
explanations for policy change (Radaelli, 2005). As such, emulation means imitation of legitimate and 
successful practice from other jurisdictions. It occurs when a policy is perceived to be the appropriate 
thing to do (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) or “epistemic communities” theorise a new solution (Haas, 
1992). Accordingly, public transport agencies and competitive tendering emerge because it is taken 
for granted that they are the most appropriate forms of organising public transport. An emulation 
hypothesis proposes that legislators copy policies from other counties. Different to learning, which 
includes a motive to improve, this latter form of diffusion may not be suited to the adopter’s needs.  
 
3. Data and Research Techniques 
There are different observable implications of these theories: Path dependency calls for an enquiry of 
the possible organisational solutions as well as existing legal frameworks and market structures. 
Diffusion through coercion requires a mapping of incentives in the EU Public Passenger Transport 
Services Regulation itself and actors’ perceptions of whether it is beneficial or there is a need to 
comply to such rules. Diffusion through competition necessitates an analysis of actors’ expectations 
of what would be the effects of introducing different organisational alternatives. If diffusion through 
learning has taken place, there will be adaptations of the selected solution to contextual factors. 
Moreover, if diffusion through emulation is a dominant mechanism this would be conveyed through 
the adherence to consultancy and researchers’ advice as well as how similar the organisational 
solution is to those in other counties.  
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Crucial evidence includes the legal framework, minutes from political meetings, consultancy 
and research reports, newspaper articles as well as six in-depth interviews with politicians in 
opposition and position, the former County Executive, the Chief Financial Officer, the Head of 
Department and a representative from the bus drivers’ union. The interviews have been important 
for establishing the mechanisms at work, whilst data from the counties’ web sites has been gathered 
for the purpose of making temporal graphs of diffusion patterns.  
 
4. Organisation of Public Transport in Sør-Trøndelag – a Path 
Dependent Decision 
In this section, an analysis of what happened in Sør-Trøndelag provides insights to better understand 
the tendency of establishing public transport agencies and introducing competitive tendering at 
subnational level. Given a legal framework that allows for reintegration, why do left-oriented 
politicians introduce such organisational principles? 
In 2007, there were three important events that created a “window of opportunity” 
(Kingdon, 2003) for organisational change of public transport in the County of Sør-Trøndelag. Firstly, 
the EU Public Passenger Transport Services Regulation, which Norway as a member of the European 
Economic Area was obliged to apply, would deem current practices of negotiations illegal as soon as 
it was transposed. Secondly, Sør-Trøndelag was about to end an experiment of organisation of public 
transport (Norheim, Nilsen, & Ruud, 2008). Normally the counties are responsible for local public 
transport (with the exception of rail), yet from 2004 to 2007 the largest city in the county, 
Trondheim, was in charge of its own public transport. At the end of the experiment this 
responsibility, including financial resources, was transferred back to the county. Thirdly, in 2007 all of 
Sør-Trøndelag’s existing compensation contracts and concessions, which allow operators to deliver 
public transport services, ended. Whilst most of these contracts were extended through 
negotiations, the county failed to agree with the bus operator producing the services in the city. As a 
temporary solution, awaiting political decisions, the contract was prolonged for a year.  
The difficult negotiations with the bus operators was a key reason as to why the legislators 
urgently wanted to reform the organisation of public transport. In 2002, the city sold the bus 
company producing city services to a private operator (Sandvik, 2008). Since that time, the public 
transport authorities had to negotiate with a private monopolist. According to civil staff and 
politicians, it was a tedious process to encourage and enforce the operator to improve their services. 
For every renewal the operator claimed more resources. Their opinion of the operator was a lack of 
proactivness to develop the services, which media had also consistenly criticised (interview st1, st4, 
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st6). The only bargaining card of the County to “discipline” the operators was to threaten with 
competitive tendering. However, for a threat to work, it needs to be credible and effective (Halfteck, 
2008). Given the red-green coalition’s dedication to vote against competition and its close ties with 
unions, the threat was not very effective. As a consequence the politicians looked for other ways of 
better being able to steer the local public transport services.  
The EU Public Passenger Transport Services Regulation included two main possibilities. 
Although enforcing competition as a main rule, it made an exception for internal operators. The 
politicians and civil staff, awaiting national transposition and expecting a long transposition period, 
were in no hurry to apply the EU Regulation, yet it importantly framed the potential organisational 
models (interviews st1, st5). Whilst the conservative and liberal politicians argued that competitive 
tendering would improve the service level; the left-oriented, which represented the majority, were 
concerned with employment issues and curious about the possibilities of establishing an internal 
operator. On the 12th of December 2007, the legislative majority decided to investigate the 
possibilities of establishing an internal operator in Sør-Trøndelag (Sør-Trøndelag fylkeskommune, 
2007, p. 2). At the same time they agreed to work towards creating a “regional organisation.” The 
aim of this organisation was to enhance coordination of information, route planning, product 
development, ticketing and fare systems as well as marketing of public transport (Sør-Trøndelag 
fylkeskommune, 2006). This was an old idea, whose intention was to improve the cooperation with 
the largest city.  
In general, the relationship between large cities and counties is competitive and likely 
strained since both hold important measures for influencing the public transport system and tend to 
blame one another when things do not work to plan (interview st6). Establishing a common 
organisation could improve the relationship between them. However, the final decision to establish 
such an agency was postponed as at that time, it was unclear who would be in charge of local public 
transport services at the end of the transport experiment (interview st2).  
Subsequently, the County administration asked an external consultant to provide an analysis 
of the possibilities of establishing both an internal operator and a public transport agency. In early 
2008, the consultant published two reports and gave an account of four alternative organisational 
models (Asplan Viak, 2008a, 2008b). These are (1) an internal operator producing services for the 
whole county; (2) a mix of internal operation in the city area of Trondheim and procurement in the 
rest of the County; (3) status quo, i.e. continued negotiations with operators, at least until the EU 
Regulation is transposed into national law; and (4) a public transport agency, whose main 
responsibility is to purchase services through competitive tendering.  
Investigating the opportunities to establish an internal operator in Sør-Trøndelag and also in 
Hedmark, the consultant suggests two ways of establishing an internal operator: The County buys an 
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already existing company or it establishes a new shell firm. Whilst voluntary agreement and agreeing 
on the premises creates the main obstacles for purchasing an existing company, the lack of 
concessions provides the main barrier to establish a new shell company. Strict concession rules 
require the County to take existing concession holders’ opinions into consideration when considering 
further concessions (Asplan Viak, 2008a, p. 4). This empowers existing companies – in practice, there 
are hardly any new concessions given for local public transport. Transfers of concession holders 
happen in circumstances of fusions or transfer of enterprise ownership and occasionally when 
operators compete for concessions at the end of a lenghty concession period. In national law, the 
only stated possibility for the public transport authorities to pull back a concession from a law-
abiding company, is to introduce competitive tendering. Thus, competitive tendering is the safest 
route to draw back a concession from a company (Asplan Viak, 2008a, p. 5). Any other “unfair” 
attempt to give a new internal operator concession is likely to raise the conflict level in the bus 
industry, inducing a risk of litigation (Asplan Viak, 2008a, p. 7). However, introducing competition and 
establishing a new internal operator does not guarantee that the new public company will win such 
competition, as the county is hardly admitted to give preference to its own company when 
evaluating the differing bids. In other words, the legal framework combined with privatisation had 
created a path, according to which, competitive tendering was the easiest, less risky and less costly 
thing to do.  
On this basis, the County Executive strongly recommended competitve tendering. The civil 
staff saw an advantage in competitive tendering as the County would then be in charge of deciding 
defined criteria in advance of entering into a contract and avoid the risk of having a business. Despite 
such benefits of competitive tendering, theories that suggest that even leftist politicians vote in 
favour of such reform, if the expected utility of competition is considerable and the costs of 
reintegration are too high (Braun & Gilardi, 2006, p. 305f), do not hold. The politicians were willing to 
take the costs that the opposition and civil staff were fearing. On the 17th of June 2008 the political 
majority decided to initiate negotiations about purchasing Team Trafikk, the enterprise operating the 
city routes in Trondheim (Sør-Trøndelag fylkeskommune, 2008c). At the same time, they decided to 
introduce competitive tendering in the remaining areas and confirmed the establishment of a public 
transport agency. Such “mixed solutions” are costly (Longva & Osland, 2010, p. 121). Not only would 
the County potentially employ around 600 bus drivers, it would also have to build up an 
administrative procurement body with planning competence for the route areas set out for 
competitive tendering.   
The decision to allow for competitive tendering was difficult to accept for several politicians. 
Yet the Labour party was divided on the issue and played an important role in getting the needed 
majority in favour of introducing some competitive tendering. Although 100 bus drivers met with 
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banners in the County Council on the day of voting, the majority actually did vote in favour of 
competition (Sør-Trøndelag fylkeskommune, 2008a). The most important push for this daring vote 
came from the frustration with the status quo – the lack of political steering and the tiring 
negotiations with the operators.   
Initially the owner of Team Trafikk seemed willing to sell the company. In an “intention 
agreement” on the 1st of July 2008, both parties assented to negotiate about transfering the bus 
company to the County. Three months later, the owner and the County agreed on a price and that 
the County would take over 80 percent of the company’s shares. At that point, politicians and civil 
staff were convinced that they would become the majority owner of the bus company. Suprisingly, 
few days after the final agreement, the owner withdrew from the offer on the 17th of October 2008 
(Sør-Trøndelag fylkeskommune, 2008b) – to the relief of some and frustration of others. Whilst civil 
staff and politicians favouring competitive tendering had feared the burdens of operating a bus 
company and been concerned about inefficiencies; those proposing reintegration of the operator felt 
that they had been fooled. Consequently, a number of politicians who were originally against 
competition, now voted in favour of procurement.  
Portraying the image as to how existing structures decreased the options available to the 
public transport authority, the analysis so far supports path dependency as explaining why the 
politicians decided to introduce competitive tendering despite an ideological commitment to do 
otherwise.  
 
5. Learning and Functional Responses 
Although Scandinavian counties tend to establish public transport agencies when introducing 
competitive procedures, there are successful examples of public transport administrations, which 
deal with competitive tendering procedures from within the county administration. So why do 
competitive tendering and agency tend to go hand-in-hand? 
An important reason is that competitive procedures require specific purchasing and planning 
competence, increasing the administrative burden. Whether a county awards contracts to operators 
directly through negotiations or use competitive tenders imply different roles for the county 
administration and politicians. Typically the operators are in charge of route planning and ticketing, 
when their contracts are directly awarded (Longva & Osland, 2010, p. 122). Differently, these 
responsibilities are in the hands of the public transport authorities in cases of competitive tendering.6  
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 For differences between concession and contract, see Christopher H. Bovis (2008, p. 159f). 
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In addition to this need of competence, the competitive environment has also generated 
larger and stronger bus operators (Mathisen & Solvoll, 2008). In general across Europe, bus operators 
have become international, the legal framework more complex and actors expect court rulings to 
settle future disputes (Leiren, 2010). In Norway there have already been a few infringements 
regarding competitive tendering procedures of local public transport. This fits well with what Daniel 
Kelemen (2011) calls a shifting “legal landscape” in Europe. He argues that there has been a growth 
of litigation and that business leaders are expecting an increase in litigation and the associated costs 
in near future. In such a reality it is wise of a county to strenghten its public transport competence, 
especially if it chooses to adopt competitive procedures. The counterpart is no longer a small, local 
operator, but may be a company with strong, “movable,” economic and legal competence, due to 
their frequent involvement in competitions (Vista Analyse AS, 2009, p. 6). 
However, this does not explain why the buyer should strenghten its competence in a 
separate agency and not internally in the administration. Vista Analyse (2009, p. 7) provides a 
justification, pointing to difficult recruitment. Arguing that bodies with responsibility of performance 
and extensive freedom of action more easily attract skilled personnel, the consultant recommends 
“autonomous” public transport agencies. According to this view, the establishment of an agency is 
necessary in order to attract and keep crucial skills for market development.  
In addition to concerns about competence, a diffusion pattern suggests that a transfer of 
policy has taken place. As Figure 2 highlights, since the second half of the 1990s counties have 
increasingly introduced separate public transport agencies.  
 
 
Figure 2. Counties with a Separate Public Transport Agency 
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Today, eleven of the 19 Norwegian counties have delegated public transport responsibilities to a 
separate agency. Figure 3 shows that there is a similar pattern of diffusion for competitive tendering.  
 
 
Figure 3. Status of Competitive Tendering in Norwegian Local Public Transport. Percentage of Local Bus Services 
Measured in Route Production (Route Kilometres) on Competitive Tendering (NHO Transport, 2011) 
 
Different mechanisms are useful for explaining the pattersn highlighted in figures 2 and 3. As has 
already been shown, in the case of Sør-Trøndelag path dependency was crucial for the outcome of 
competitive tendering. Although civil staff were concerned with what other counties had 
implemented (interview st2), such interdependence was not important in Sør-Trøndelag as the 
political majority was willing to go against this pattern. Therefore, diffusion does not explain the 
choice of competitive tendering in Sør-Trøndelag. 
The decision to establish an agency differs from that of competitive tendering. Whilst the 
dispute of competitive tendering was ideological, the rationale behind the agency was to improve 
the services through enhanced cooperation with the city and the neighbouring county and achieve 
better coordination of different modes (interview st1). If the aim of improved services had been part 
of a strategy to become better than other counties, this would have supported the competition 
hypothesis. However, there is no such evidence. The evidence suggests that the agency was mainly a 
rational decision, in order to improve the public transport system for the county’s citizens.  
Nevertheless, the agency design was decisively influenced by experience in other counties. 
Civil staff, politicians, a consultant and union representatives travelled on a study trip to other 
Norwegian and Swedish counties that had created agencies and introduced competitive tendering. 
The exchange of experiences at such trips contributed to form the decisions. There was especially 
one county that informants remember well. In Rogaland, issues such as route changes and technical 
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problems of ticketing systems damaged the relationship between the politicians and the agency 
(Vista Analyse AS, 2008). The problems resulted in a serious lack of trust. As compensation, the 
politicians began to steer the agency in the details – to the extent as if the agency had been an 
internal department in the county (Vista Analyse AS, 2008). Accordingly, the agency’s scope of action 
was limited, thereby causing frustration and neglection of duties.7  
In Sør-Trøndelag such problems were perceived as specific for the hybrid solution adopted in 
Rogaland, a public enterprise with a political board. In their opinion, both Swedish and Norwegian 
agencies organised as limited companies with professional boards seemed to perform better. This 
was decisive for their own choice of creating a limited company with a professional board. It also 
convinced them that, given the desire of politicians to get involved in everyday-life details, a distance 
to the agency would be beneficial (interview st5). In other words, as the legislators did more than 
just copying other counties, learning and not emulation contributes to explaining the choice of the 
agency model. There was a great amount of learning. 
Finally, as there are no incentives or requirements in the national nor European legal 
framework favouring a public transport agency model, coercion has not been present. Differently, 
there are elements of coercion for competitive tendering. Since the late 1990s, advocates of 
competition have argued that the EU would eventually enforce procurement (interview st3, st6). 
However, at the time of decision making in Sør-Trøndelag this was no longer the case as the 
Regulation had already introduced exceptions from competition and the national government had 
signalised that it would transpose all these exceptions into national law. It was clear that compliance 
required organisational changes, but not necessarily competition. Therefore, the public transport 
authority in Sør-Trøndelag perceived itself as free to choose between alternatives (interview st2, 
st3). The spur to change the status quo was mainly driven by functional responses at local level 
(interview st5, st6).  
 
                                                          
7
 Issues with delineation of roles between politicians and the agency has been addressed in the literature on 
agencies. When turmoil arises and users complain, politicians find themselves drawn towards the operational 
level (Longva & Osland, 2010, p. 122). Although political steering normally happens through a general 
agreement, which regulates the division of responsibilities, and a yearly contract, which specifies the service 
level, in everyday life the separation of roles is both unclear and difficult to accept (Vista Analyse AS, 2008). 
“The distinction between policy and operational matters is not the same as the distinction between politics and 
administration (Hogwood, Judge, & McVicar, 2001, p. 44).” In such “grey zones” between autonomy and 
political steering (Christensen & Lægreid, 2006), politicians are likely to demand more hierarchical intervention. 
This happens “exactly when the conditions for hierarchical intervention are no longer present (Lodge, 2008, p. 
285).”  
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6. Concluding Thoughts 
The findings suggest that once privatisation has occurred in the market, it is difficult to take private 
enterprises back into public hands or to establish new public companies. The main reason is that 
current legislation with strict concession rules makes existing operators empowered that in turn 
makes new establishments difficult. Neither is the alternative to buy an existing company an easy 
solution, as it depends on the owners’ willingness to sell. Hence, contradictory as it may seem, 
competitive tendering is the most appropriate way to go, in order to increase political steering. That 
way public transport authorities may – without legal uncertainty – withdraw existing concessions and 
bring route planning competence back into public hands. As shown, most counties do so by 
establishing a separate agency. Yet whilst path dependency explains the introduction of competitive 
tendering, the motive of improving coordination in the public transport system explains the 
establishment of the agency in Sør-Trøndelag. The agency design was crucially influenced by learning 
from other counties. 
 
7. References 
Asplan Viak. (2008a). Fylkeskommunale busselskaper i Sør-Trøndelag og Hedmark. 
Asplan Viak. (2008b). Organisering av kollektivtrafikken i Sør-Trøndelag. 
Bovis, C. H. (2008). EU Public Procurement Law. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Braun, D., & Gilardi, F. (2006). Taking ‘Galton's Problem’ Seriously: Towards a Theory of Policy 
Diffusion. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 18(3), 298. 
Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2003). Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe. In K. a. C. R. 
Featherstone (Ed.), The Politics of Europeanization (pp. 57-83). New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Christensen, T., & Lægreid, P. (2006). Agencification and Regulatory Reforms. In T. Christensen & P. 
Lægreid (Eds.), Autonomy and Regulation: Coping with Agencies in the Modern State. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and 
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields. American Sociological Review, 48(2), 147-160. 
Domberger, S., & Rimmer, S. (1994). Competitive Tendering and Contracting in the Public Sector: A 
Survey International Journal of the Economics of Business, 1(3). 
Elkins, Z., & Simmons, B. (2005). On Waves, Clusters, and Diffusion: A Conceptual Framework. The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 598(1), 33. 
Flinders, M. (2004). Distributed Public Governance in the European Union. [Article]. Journal of 
European Public Policy, 11(3), 520-544. 
Goldsmith, M. (1993). The Europeanisation of Local Government. Urban Studies, 30(4-5), 683. 
Gray, V. (1973). Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study. The American Political Science Review, 
67(4), 1174-1185. 
Gwilliam, K. M., & van de Velde, D. M. (1990). The Potential for Regulatory Change in European Bus 
Markets. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 24(3), 333-350. 
Halfteck, G. (2008). Legislative Threats. Stanford Law Review, 61(3), 629-710. 
Hall, P., & Taylor, R. (1996). Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms. Köln: Max-Planck-
Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung. 
15 
 
Hensher, D. A., & Wallis, I. P. (2005). Competitive Tendering as a Contracting Mechanism for 
Subsidising Transport: the Bus Experience. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 39(3), 
295-322. 
Hogwood, B., Judge, D., & McVicar, M. (2001). Agencies, Ministers and Civil Servants in Britain. In G. 
Peters & J. Pierre (Eds.), Politicians, Bureaucrats and Administrative Reform (pp. 35-44). New 
York: Routledge. 
Howarth, D., & Sadeh, T. (2010). The Ever Incomplete Single Market: Differentiation and the Evolving 
Frontier of Integration. Journal of European Public Policy, 17(7), 922-935. 
Haas, P. M. (1992). Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination. 
International Organization, 46(1), 1-35. 
John, P. (2000). The Europeanisation of Sub-national Governance. Urban Studies, 37(5-6), 877-894. 
Johnsen, Å., Sletnes, I., & Vabo, S. I. (2004). Konklusjoner. In Å. Johnsen, I. Sletnes & S. I. Vabo (Eds.), 
Konkurranseutsetting i kommunene (pp. 366-377). Oslo: Abstrakt Forlag AS. 
Kaeding, M. (2007). Better Regulation in the European Union: Lost in Translation or Full Steam 
Ahead? The Transposition of EU Transport Directives Across Member States. Leiden: Leiden 
University Press. 
Kelemen, R. D. (2011). Eurolegalism: The Transformation of Law and Regulation in the European 
Union Harvard University Press. 
Kelemen, R. D., & Sibbitt, E. C. (2004). The Globalization of American Law. International Organization, 
58(1), 103-136. 
Kingdon, J. W. (2003). Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (2 ed.). New York: Longman. 
Knill, C., & Lehmkuhl, D. (2002). The National Impact of European Union Regulatory Policy: Three 
Europeanization Mechanisms. European Journal of Political Research, 41(2), 255--280. 
Leiren, M. D. (2010). EUs kollektivtransportforordning - et halvt år etter: Aktørene posisjonerer seg. 
Samferdsel(6), 8-9. 
Lodge, M. (2008). Regulation, the Regulatory State and European Politics. West European Politics, 
31(1), 280-301. 
Longva, F., & Osland, O. (2010). Regulating the Regulator: The Impact of Professional Procuring 
Bodies on Local Public Transport Policy and its Effectiveness. Research in Transportation 
Economics, 29, 118-123. 
Majone, G. (1996). The Political Economy of Regulation. In G. Majone (Ed.), Regulating Europe (pp. 9-
79). New York: Routledge. 
Mathisen, T. A., & Solvoll, G. (2008). Competitive Tendering and Structural Changes: An Example 
from the Bus Industry. Transport Policy, 15(1), 1-11. 
NHO Transport. (2011). Rutebil: Mer enn 50 prosent på anbud.   Retrieved 23rd August, 2011, from 
http://www.transport.no/anbudsoversikt/category532.html 
Nicolaïdis, K., & Schmidt, S. K. (2007). Mutual Recognition 'on Trial': the Long Road to Services 
Liberalization. [Article]. Journal of European Public Policy, 14(5), 717-734. 
Norheim, B., Nilsen, J., & Ruud, A. (2008). Forsøk med alternativ forvaltningsorganisering av 
transportsektoren. Evaluering av forsøkene i Trondheim, Bergen, Kristiansand-regionen og på 
Nord-Jæren. Oslo: Urbanet Analyse, NIVI Analyse. 
O'Sullivan, P. J., & Patel, T. (2004). Fragmentation in Transport Operations and the Case for System 
Integrity. Transport Policy, 11(3), 215-225. 
Pierson, P. (2004). Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press  
Prosser, T. (2010). The Regulatory Enterprise. Government, Regulation and Legitimacy. New York: 
Oxford University Press Inc. 
Radaelli, C. (2005). Diffusion Without Convergence: How Political Context Shapes the Adoption of 
Regulatory Impact Assessment. Journal of European Public Policy, 12(5), 924-943. 
Sanders, E. (2006). Historical Institutionalism. In R. A. W. Rhodes, S. A. Binder & B. A. Rockman (Eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions (pp. 39-55). Oxford, New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
16 
 
Sandvik, R. L. (2008, 9 June). Går mot historisk busstreik. Klassekampen. Retrieved from 
http://www.klassekampen.no/54467/article/item/null/gaar-mot-historisk-busstreik# 
Schmidt, S. K. (2009). When Efficiency Results in Redistribution: The Conflict over the Single Services 
Market. West European Politics, 32(4), 847-865. 
Simmons, B., Dobbin, F., & Garrett, G. (2008). Introduction: the diffusion of liberalization. In D. B. 
Simmons, F. and Garrett, G. (Ed.), The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Sverdrup, U. (2007). Implementation. In P. Graziano & M. P. Vink (Eds.), Europeanization. New 
Research Agendas (pp. 197-211). New York: Palgrave MacMillan. 
Sør-Trøndelag fylkeskommune. (2006). Notat om ny innkjøpsorganisasjon for kollektivtransport i Sør-
Trøndelag. Retrieved from http://pa.stfk.no. 
Sør-Trøndelag fylkeskommune. (2007). Saksutredning: Nye avtaler med busselskaper og godkjenning 
av takstnivå 2008. Retrieved from http://pa.stfk.no. 
Sør-Trøndelag fylkeskommune. (2008a). Anbud og selskapskjøp.   Retrieved 1 September, 2011, from 
http://www.stfk.no/en/Nyheter-Internett/Anbud-og-selskapskjop/ 
Sør-Trøndelag fylkeskommune. (2008b). Sak 317 Ingen avtale om kjøp av Team Trafikk. Grunnlag for 
det videre arbeid med kjøp av rutetjenester i Trondheim og i resten av fylket. 
Sør-Trøndelag fylkeskommune. (2008c). Saksprotokoll: Organisering av kollektivtransporten i Sør-
Trøndelag, sak 54/2008. Retrieved from 
http://pa.stfk.no/pa_fulltekst/Fylkestinget//588671_1_1.PDF. 
Sørensen, R. J., Borge, L.-E., & Hagen, T. P. (1999). Effektivitet i offentlig tjenesteyting. Bergen: 
Fagbokforlaget. 
Treib, O. (2008). Implementing and Complying with EU Governance Outputs. Living Reviews in 
European Governance, 3(5). 
Van de Velde, D. M. (1999). Organisational Forms and Entrepreneurship in Public Transport: 
Classifying Organisational Forms. Transport Policy, 6(3), 147-157. 
Van de Velde, D. M. (2001). The Evolution of Organisational Forms in European Public Transport. 
Paper presented at the 7th Conference on Competition and Ownership in Land Passenger 
Transport.  
Vista Analyse AS. (2008). Rogaland Kollektivtrafikk FKF. Ekstern evaluering. 
Vista Analyse AS. (2009). Organisasjonsform for planlegging og drift av kollektivtrafikken i Hedmark 
og Oppland. 
Walker, J. L. (1969). The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States. The American Political 
Science Review, 63(3), 880-899. 
Yeung, K. (2010). The Regulatory State. In R. Baldwin, M. Cave & M. Lodge (Eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Regulation (pp. 64-85). Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
 
